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Abstract 
 
Since the 1980s state schools in England have been required to ensure 
transparency and accountability through the use of indicators and templates derived 
from the private sector and, more recently, globally circulating discourses of 'good 
governance’ (an appeal to professional standards, technical expertise and 
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performance evaluation as mechanisms for improving public service delivery). The 
rise of academies and free schools ('state-funded independent schools’) has 
increased demand for good governance, notably as a means by which to discipline 
schools, in particular school governors – those tasked with the legal responsibility of 
holding senior leadership to account for the financial and educational performance of 
schools. A condition and effect of school autonomy therefore is increased monitoring 
and surveillance of all school governing bodies. In this paper I demonstrate how 
these twin processes combine to produce a new modality of state power and 
intervention; a dominant or organizing principle by which government steer the 
performance of governors through disciplinary tools of professionalization and 
inspection, with the aim of achieving the 'control of control’ (Power 1994). To explain 
these trends I explore how various established and emerging school governing 
bodies are (re)constituting themselves to meet demands for good governance. 
 
 
Good governance as a modality of state power 
 
The rise of academies and free schools ('state-funded independent schools’) in 
England since 2010 has led to increased school autonomy for large numbers of state 
primary and secondary schools coupled with an increased demand for ‘good 
governance’ (an appeal to professional standards, technical expertise and 
performance evaluation as mechanisms for improving public service delivery), with 
direct consequences for school governors. Described by Ranson et al. as ‘the largest 
democratic experiment in voluntary public participation’ (2005, 357), school 
governors refer to the non-executive (unpaid) members of the governing body (GB)1 
who, through election or appointment, work alongside executive, senior leadership 
figures (headteachers, associate/deputy headteachers, school business managers, 
premises managers, finance directors, etc.) to support the operation and strategy of 
state schools. Up until the introduction of Local Management of Schools (LMS) in the 
1980s, school governors performed their role in the relatively safe, comfortable and 
informal environment of a ‘bums on seats’ culture. (There are echoes of this past 
culture when governors talk affectionately and somewhat nostalgically about the 
provision of 'tea and biscuits' that circulate any governors meeting and which work 
ceremoniously to enjoin governors through friendly and mutually supportive 
conversations). During this time standards, curriculum and finance for the majority of 
schools remained the legal responsibility of local government, though some 
'maintained' (LEA controlled) schools were permitted a level of autonomy over 
decisions concerning resource allocation and budget due to the capacity and 
1 Depending on the type of school, GBs go by different names. For schools operating within a Multi-
Academy Trust (MAT), the GB, if one exists, is called a Local Governing Body (LGB) or ‘advisory 
group’. Under these arrangements many of the high-risk decisions concerning strategy, finance, 
admissions, premises and curriculum are decided by the trustees of the MAT and sent to the LGB for 
feedback/deliberation. In many stand-alone (converter) academies, free schools and maintained 
schools, the GB is called a Full Governing Body (FGB), but technically this only applies when all 
governors are present. Alongside the FGB are committees with governors who, by virtue of their 
expertise, deal with specific areas of governance. A typical school will have five committees – 
education and standards, finance and audit, human resources, premises, and pastoral and wellbeing. 
I have selected to use the preferred term governing body (GB) by way of condensing the varied and 
complicated work undertaken by school governors. Unfortunately the scope of this paper does not 
lend itself to a full discussion of the division of labour that underpins and animates school governance. 
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willingness of the GB to do so. Therefore, while school governors have for a long 
time (since the 1980s in fact) possessed statutory rights to influence schools, their 
actions (or lack of) have not been tied to any formal powers, inherent risk or liability. 
Today, however, local government power has been rolled back to allow all schools to 
be administratively self-governing. A consequence of this ‘high-stakes’ transfer of 
power is that school governors are tasked with the legal responsibility of holding 
senior leadership to account for the financial and educational performance of 
schools. 
 
Earlier legislation (Education Act 1944 and Education (No 2) Act 1968) outlines the 
existence of ‘school governing bodies’ in the case of secondary schools and, 
similarly, ‘managing bodies’ in the case of primary schools. In the case of the latter, 
the local education authority (LEA) possessed a ‘wide discretion’ over composition 
and function (DES 1977: 2.3) while the role and constitution of GBs had to be ‘set 
out by the local education authority in articles of government which have to be 
approved by the Secretary of State’ (DES 1977: 2.4). Later through the 1980 
Education Act the government introduced measures to specify the remit and 
composition of the GB, e.g. the division and role of parent governors, staff 
governors, LEA governors and community governors. Subsequent legislation 
(Education (No 2) Act 1986, Education Act 1993, Education Reform Act 1988, 
Education Act 2002, Education Act 2006) extended the responsibilities of school 
governors, principally to ‘conduct the school with a view to promoting high standards 
of educational achievement at the school’ (School Standards and Framework Act 
1998, Pt. II, Chap. III, Section 38). The previous Labour government highlighted an 
additional key role of the GB, namely to facilitate a ‘stakeholder model’ of school 
governance, one ‘designed to ensure representation of key stakeholders (parents, 
staff, community, LEA, foundation and sponsors)’ and which ‘helps GBs to be 
accountable to parents, pupils, staff and the local community’ (DfES 2005, 7). 
Nonetheless, some commentators consider government attempts to specify the role 
of school governors and of the GB as a whole as hazy at best (Balarin et al. 2008). 
 
Despite some confusion and uncertainty over school governor aims and direction, 
what is clear today is the proposed strategic function of school governors in relation 
to enhancing accountability. Both the government and the Office for Standards in 
Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted, the schools inspectorate) strictly 
discourage school governors from engaging in the operational functions of running 
the school, now the key delegated role of the headteacher and senior leadership 
team (SLT) (see DfES 2005, Ofsted 2001, 2011). Recent announcements and 
statutory guidance from the Department for Education (DfE) (2013a) and Ofsted 
(2011) highlight instead the new, legal responsibilities to be undertaken by school 
governors. Specifically, school governors are branded key to facilitating ‘good 
governance’, which includes providing scrutiny of direction, enabling strategy and 
ensuring accountability (DfE 2013a; also see Ofsted 2011). As Chief Inspector of 
Schools and the head of Ofsted, Sir Michael Wilshaw (Ofsted 2013), recently 
commented,  
 
Poor governance focuses on the marginal rather than the key issues. In other 
words, too much time spent looking at the quality of school lunches and not 
enough on Maths and English. 
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Echoing this, the Secretary of State for Education Michael Gove conflates ‘poor 
governance’ with ‘failure to be rigorous about performance. A failure to challenge 
heads forensically and also, when heads are doing a good job, support them 
authoritatively’ (Gove quoted in Rayner 2012). School governors, therefore, are 
expected to be more than cheerleaders for the school or what Gove describes as 
‘local worthies’: those ‘who see being a governor as a badge of status not a job of 
work’ (Gove quoted in Rayner 2012). Instead, school governors are summoned as 
‘experts’ (technicians, analysts and epistemic actors) who are ‘skilled’ and committed 
to ensuring accountability and shaping strategy through rigorous tracking and 
analysis of performance and finance data. But school governors themselves are 
inspected and held to account (by Ofsted and senior leadership, for example, where 
they are subject to performance evaluation) and encouraged to acquire new skills 
and attitudes as 'professionals' through internal/external training. Governors are 
expected to be educated and properly guided on how to effectively challenge and 
support schools. 
 
In this paper I demonstrate how good governance operates as a new modality of 
state power and intervention – a dominant or organizing principle by which 
government steer the performance of governors through disciplinary tools of 
professionalization and inspection, with the aim to achieve the 'control of control’ 
(Power 1994). In what follows I briefly sketch two interrelated trends which 
have shaped educational governance since the 1980s. Following this I specify how 
these trends have been articulated and combined through policy texts and political 
speeches specifying the role and responsibility of school governors as well as the 
steering capacity of non-governmental agencies in these processes. Here I 
demonstrate how norms and practices of inspection and professionalization have 
been deployed to shape the way in which GBs constitute themselves operationally, 
namely through an appeal to professional standards, technical expertise and the 
appointment of 'skilled' governors. In the final section I draw on interview and 
observation data to demonstrate concretely how the above ‘discursive and political 
work of articulation’ (Clarke 2008, 139) both transform the spaces in which schools 
operate and reconfigure the relations and practices through which school governors 
inhabit and perform their role. 
 
Neoliberalization and depoliticization 
 
Since the 1980s educational governance in England has been shaped by two 
interrelated trends. The first is the devolution of power and responsibility to all non-
maintained and maintained schools; a process known as decentralization or 
deregulation. In the case of maintained schools (schools guided and managed by the 
LEA), the 1988 Education Reform Act issued GBs with responsibility for the school’s 
budget. The same piece of legislation also allowed some schools greater control 
over their finances, admissions, premises and staff through the acquisition of ‘grant-
maintained status’. Take the example of City Technology Colleges (CTCs) introduced 
under the terms of the Education Reform Act 1988 and the Local Management of 
Schools (LMS). These schools operate outside the purview of LEA management 
(making them non-maintained) to enable the maximum delegation of financial and 
managerial responsibilities to the GB (Whitty, Edwards & Gewirtz 1993). The basic 
legal model for CTCs (state funded and privately run pursuant to a contract with the 
Secretary of State) is the same model for academies and free schools today, albeit 
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funding agreements for academies post 2010 are variable (Wolfe 2013). Under these 
arrangements school governors adopt legal responsibility for the financial and 
educational performance of the school. An outcome of these changes is greater 
school autonomy, which means schools can opt out of LEA control and become 
administratively self-governing. But autonomy is earned (‘earned autonomy’). 
Converter academies and free schools (both free-standing, state-funded 
independent schools) typically must employ temporary or permanent staff (e.g. 
school business manager/bursar, HR manager, finance director, estate manager) 
and appoint 'skilled' volunteers (e.g. school governors, preferably barristers, 
chartered surveyors, accountants, civil servants, middle managers, people with 
experience of running a business) who can help shape high-risk decisions relating to 
finance, curriculum, standards, human resources, premises, and strategy. These 
changes to the form and structure of state schools are part of a set of technologies 
or strategies to 'modernize' (or 'privatize') public services and reduce the influence of 
local government and local politics on public sector organization (Vidler and Clarke 
2005). 
 
A second, related trend to impact educational governance concerns a movement to 
situate schools within a culture of ‘testing, targets, and tables’ (DfES 2004). Ranson 
(2003) for example identifies four measures of accountability through which schools 
are made to answer: performative accountability (examinations and assessment), 
contract accountability (cost effectiveness), consumer accountability (parental 
choice), and corporate accountability (strategy and management). In this framing 
schools are assessed, sorted, funded and ranked on the basis of regulatory 
practices (e.g. testing, league table results, Ofsted inspection criteria) and 
disciplinary practices enacted internally by the school (performance operation and 
management, competitive tendering, etc.). These competitive-comparative practices 
echo and redeem private sector approaches to public sector organization, with 
rewards for those schools who best demonstrate process, performance and 
outcomes. Such organizational forms are evocative of New Public Management 
(NPM) approaches to service delivery (see Clarke and Newman 1997), namely the 
idea that organizations share characteristics which can be evaluated and compared 
to measure effectiveness, efficiency, and continuous improvement. These practices 
may be considered technologies of power, mechanisms by which public services are 
specified through processes and outcomes which lend them to audit, measurement 
and commensuration. Such mechanisms are well documented through different 
registers, including 'good governance’ (IMF, World Bank), 'generic management’ 
(Cutler and Waine 1997), Total Quality Management (TQM), 'enterprise culture’ (Keat 
and Abercrombie 1990), ‘lure of the explicit’ (Green 2011, 49) and ‘cult of efficiency’ 
(Stein 2001, 7). Broadly speaking, they encompass a set of relations and practices 
which may be described as forms of neoliberalization. 
 
If we take neoliberalization to mean the monetization, financialization and 
marketization of institutions and agents (Clarke 2008), including an enabling role for 
the state in disseminating, inventing or supplementing market practices and 
behaviours across sites and domains where they may not exist (Brown 2006), the 
above trends may be regarded as expressions of a neoliberal logic. In particular, 
they highlight how political problems formerly managed by local government are 
reduced to a set of discrete, largely technical practices mobilized by the professional 
classes in a bid to better govern schools. As Clarke suggests, neoliberalization can 
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be understood ‘as the latest in a dishonourable history of strategies of 
“depoliticization” of politics that attempt to conceal the problems and conflicts of 
politics behind an appeal to forms of knowledge and varieties of technical expertise’ 
(2008, 142). What this means is that the politics and practice of managing particular 
legal, social or financial problems (problems of population, student discipline, 
resource allocation, admissions, standards, ethos, community participation, etc.) 
remain. The difference however is that these problems are now handled discretely 
under the new legal authority of the executive and non-executive members of GBs, 
trustees and potentially unaccountable sponsors. Hence the growing demands for 
good governance, skilled, preferably non-partisan governors, and increased 
monitoring and surveillance. Problems around the wide discretion of unaccountable 
sponsors and GBs to exert influence over a school’s budget, vision and curriculum is 
now a key focus of Ofsted, for example (Wintour 2014). The recent ‘Trojan horse’ 
row details how three schools in Birmingham run by Park View Educational Trust 
were downgraded by Ofsted to inadequate and placed in special measures for, 
among other things, using school budget improperly and failing to tackle potential 
risks of religious extremism and radicalization among students (Morris and Wintour 
2014). Notably, there was expressed disappointment and anger at ‘some governors 
exerting inappropriate influence over the running of their schools’ (Adams 2014), a 
good example of how increased responsibility and visibility and surveillance go hand 
in hand. 
 
In what follows I highlight 1) the direct implications of school autonomy for school 
governors in terms of function and responsibility; and 2) the mechanisms by which 
government and non-government agencies aim to steer the performance of school 
governors toward new calculative regimes of accountability and professionalization. 
 
Academization: accountability deficit? 
 
The launch of city academies in 2000 under New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ philosophy 
(Giddens 1998) heralded a new phase in the neoliberalization of state education. 
Designed to enlist the help of private sponsors to offer ‘radical and innovative 
challenges to tackling educational disadvantage’ (DfES 2005, 29), the city 
academies project granted schools and their sponsors powers to bypass local 
democratic processes (Beckett 2007; Hatcher and Jones 2006; Millar 2010) by 
circumventing the scope of local government steering and control, including the 
electoral mandate of local councillors to monitor and intervene in schools. As a result 
some commentators lambasted the academies programme as a ‘loss to the 
community’ (Unison 2010). Between September 2002 and May 2010, 210 
academies opened in England under (New) Labour (BBC 2012). In May 2010 under 
the leadership of the Coalition government, new legislation was rolled out making it 
possible for all good and outstanding schools – including, for the first time, primary 
and special schools – to opt out of LEA control and become administratively self-
governing. According to recent statistics obtained by the DfE in June 2014 (DfE 
2014a), 3,924 state secondary and primary schools have converted to academy 
status, 1,105 schools have opened as academies under the guidance of a sponsor, 
and 252 academy conversions are due to open on or around September 2014. 
Statistics disclosed by the DfE in May 2014 also indicate that 174 free schools have 
been established with a further 120 proposed to open in 2014 and beyond (DfE 
2014b). 
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Unfortunately the transfer of power and ownership from central government to 
institutions and agents (evocative of Prime Minister David Cameron’s vision of a ‘Big 
Society’) does not guarantee an improved system for monitoring and delivering 
public services, nor does it guarantee improved accountability or transparency. (The 
government, however, is convinced by PISA (Programme for International Student 
Assessment) results that there is a relationship between school autonomy and 
school improvement, see DfE 2014c). When a school chooses to convert to 
academy status (or is forcibly transferred under the convert bullying of DfE-employed 
‘academy brokers’, see Holehouse 2013) the GB and/or trustees adopt legal 
responsibility for the financial and educational performance of the school as well as 
responsibility for how well the GB conducts itself (now the judgement of Ofsted, see 
Ofsted 2014). 
 
With local government support services being scaled back or withdrawn entirely to 
cope with huge budget cuts (£11.6bn for the period 2015-16, see BBC 2013a), there 
is a real and present danger of a regulatory gap. Only recently the DfE announced 
that 14 academy chains (including E-ACT, Academies Enterprise Trust, Academy 
Transformation Trust, and Prospects Academies Trust) would not be eligible to 
sponsor any more state schools due to a poor track record of falling educational 
standards and financial mismanagement (Paton 2014). (A drop in the pond when you 
consider as of February 2014 there are 569 academy sponsors in existence in 
England, see GUK 2014). The DfE itself is beginning to show signs of insecurity over 
their lack of powers to intervene in the running of free schools and academies, as 
revealed in a leaked document uncovered by the Guardian (Adams & Mansell 2014). 
Media stories from 2013 offer further examples of the problems faced by a regulatory 
gap in the emerging school system: Camden Juniors primary school forced into 
Harris academy takeover despite overwhelming opposition from consultees (Sleigh 
2013); evidence of financial mismanagement at King’s Science Academy (BBC 
2013b); Ofsted’s damning report of the Al-Madinah free school (Adams 2013); 
parents in special needs row with Harris academy chain (Mansell 2013); and 
evidence of related party transactions by the Academies Education Trust (AET) 
(Boffey 2013). 
 
School autonomy: inspection and professionalization 
 
The government has partly responded to this problem – arguably a problem of its 
own making – by demanding, first, the inspection of all GBs. All Ofsted reports now 
include an evaluation of school governors in the section on leadership and 
management. Governors are typically assessed on whether they demonstrate 
sufficient knowledge or understanding of school budget and performance data. 
Therefore, school governors are evaluated on their preparedness and willingness to 
hold senior leadership to account. These interventions are justified on the grounds of 
an increased accountability risk for those schools wishing to plough their own furrow 
(risk of poor governance, poor training, poor evaluation, poor oversight, poor 
challenge, poor standards when left unchecked, etc.). Second, government together 
with Ofsted are now appealing to GBs to conduct themselves through professional 
standards and technical expertise provided by 'high quality’ governors who possess 
the 'right' skills and knowledge. (And remember this is only an appeal. Governor 
training is not mandatory and academies and free schools are granted flexibility to 
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decide their size, number of subcommittees, ratio of skilled to unskilled governors, 
and delegation of power). As Schools Minister Lord Nash (GUK 2013) highlighted in 
a speech to the Independent Academies Association (IAA) national conference, 
 
I’m certainly not opposed to parents and staff being on the GB, but people 
should be appointed on a clear prospectus and because of their skills and 
expertise as governors; not simply because they represent particular interest 
groups…Running a school is in many ways like running a business, so we 
need more business people coming forward to become governors. 
 
Echoing this, the DfE’s (2014d, 2:1) proposed amendments to the 2012 constitution 
regulations for maintained school GBs (under consultation) argue 
 
GBs have a vital role to play as the non-executive leaders of our schools. It is 
their role to set the strategic direction of the school and hold the headteacher 
to account for its educational and financial performance. This is a demanding 
task, and we think that anyone appointed to the GB should therefore have the 
skills to contribute to effective governance and the success of the 
school…This could include specific skills such as an ability to understand data 
or finances as well as general capabilities such as the capacity and 
willingness to learn. 
 
To complement and support the professionalization of school governors there exists 
a variety of non-governmental ‘third sector’ agencies (governor support services) 
offering technical advice and guidance on how GBs might conduct themselves 
efficiently and effectively. Key governor support agencies include the National 
Governors Association (NGA), Freedom and Autonomy for Schools – National 
Association (FASNA), Ten Governor Support, School Governors’ One-Stop Shop 
(SGOSS), and Modern Governor. It is important to note here the application of 
Rhodes’ conceptualization of ‘policy networks’, which he uses to refer to the shift 
from government to ‘governance’ (governing without government), but more 
specifically 'to sets of formal and informal institutional linkages between 
governmental and other actors shared around interests in public policy making and 
implementation’ (2007, 1244). The key thing to note here is that the state has not 
been 'hollowed out' (depleted of its powers to shape the governing of public services) 
but rather has been reinvented through a new role, modality or rationality, that of 
supporting and incentivizing agencies, infrastructures or frameworks which work to 
locate public service professionals and volunteers through relations and practices of 
marketization and financialization. 
 
From this perspective, governor support services may be considered ‘policy 
communities' or 'policy devices' (Ball 2008) which do not work over and against the 
state, but in relation to the state. In other words, these non-governmental agencies 
do the work of the state by promoting and legitimating the entanglement of state-
market interests: they work to align the politics and practice of schools with various 
government requirements specifying the corporate accountability and contract 
responsibility of schools as businesses. Much of what governor support services 
offer is advice which GB can use (and many of them do with great effect) to measure 
and evidence practices of good governance. This usually includes an emphasis on 
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robust monitoring of financial and educational performance; effective challenge and 
support to senior leadership; an awareness of key duties and priorities with a focus 
on enabling strategy and performance operation; and the importance of good 
clerking and paper trails to evidence transparency, internal audit and impact. 
Understood in this way, governor support networks are crucial, on the one hand, in 
enabling/prompting GBs to internalize the disciplinary practices by which they can 
self-govern as autonomous agents. On the other hand, they capture the steering 
power of central government, and indeed the idea of good governance as a 
dominant or organizing principle by which government guide the performance of 
governors through disciplinary tools of professionalization and inspection, and 
achieve the 'control of control’ (Power 1994). On this account, the inspection and 
professionalization of GBs constitute policy technologies and disciplinary strategies 
aimed at inscribing difference (differences between effective and ineffective GBs, for 
example) together with making processes and subjects knowable and visible in order 
that they may be managed. According to Foucault, discipline ‘normalizes’ and ‘of 
course analyzes and breaks down; it breaks down individuals, places, time, 
movements, actions and operations. It breaks them down into components such that 
they can be seen, on the one hand, and modified on the other’ (2009, 56). In other 
words, disciplinary power works on and through human subjects as objects of the 
state gaze through ‘a principle of compulsory visibility’ (Foucault 1979, 187). 
 
In the next section I briefly outline details of the project surrounding this paper. 
Following this, I draw on interview and observation data to demonstrate concretely 
how existing and emerging GBs are (re-)constituting themselves in response to 
demands for good governance, notably the role of inspection and 
professionalization. 
 
Research data and methods 
 
In this article I draw on preliminary findings from an ongoing research project funded 
by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) (grant ref. ES/K001299/1) 
(2012-2015). A central foci of the project concerns exploring how ‘school governance’ 
and in particular ‘good governance’ is shaped and informed by particular legal, 
moral, technical and professional judgements, and how school governance is 
enacted and decided through the formal delegation of powers to different individuals, 
from the trustees to the chairs of committees and school governors. In-depth data 
has been collected across nine different types of primary and secondary schools in 
England, including two free schools, three converter and sponsor academies, one 
foundation school and three community (LEA maintained) schools. As detailed in the 
table below, some of these schools operate within different Collaboration, Federation 
and Trust arrangements, including Multi-Academy Trust (MAT) and Co-operative 
Trust models. 
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Table 1 
 
 
Data collected includes telephone and face-to-face interviews (in-depth interviews 
carried out with 102 headteachers, senior leadership, school business managers, 
and school governors), observation material (42 FGB, LGB and committee meetings 
observed), documentary evidence (school policy documents, school improvement 
plans, scheme of delegated authority, annual budget reports, governor visit reports, 
minutes from meetings, headteachers report to governors, articles of association, 
and pupil performance and progression data), and relevant government and non-
government texts specifying the role and responsibility of school governors. In line 
with the principles of conventional case study approaches (Yin 1994), the research 
method for the project is framed by inductive theorizing (descriptive and inferential) 
and the identification of instances of replication and relatability across school 
contexts, together with a focus on ‘particularisation’ (the specificity and complexity of 
phenomena across contexts), thick description and phenomenological meaning, 
namely how agency and social action is shaped inter-subjectively through the 
interaction of meso, micro and macro structures. 
 
To ensure anonymity and confidentiality of material, the real names of all 
interviewees and schools have been replaced with a pseudonym. Similarly, 
pseudonyms have been used to conceal the real names of any other individuals and 
institutions mentioned. To ‘make sense’ of the data for the purpose of this article I will 
explore the application of some of the terms and arguments already examined 
above. Specifically, I utilize Foucault’s (1979) conception of ‘governmentality’: the 
norms and technologies by which the state-form works to define and regulate social 
School Name 
(pseudonym)
Location Phase of Education Type of Establishment Collaboration and 
Federation
Admissions Criteria Recent Ofsted 
Rating
Millard London Primary School Free School Multi-Academy Trust 
(MAT)
Non-denominational, co-
educational and non-
selective 
Pending
Canterbury London Secondary School Community Local Authority Non-denominational, co-
educational and non-
selective
Satisfactory (2009)
Richford London Secondary School Sponsor Academy Multi-Academy Trust 
(MAT)
Non-denominational, co-
educational and non-
selective
Outstanding (2014)
Montague London Secondary School Converter Academy Stand-alone school Non-denominational, co-
educational and non-
selective
Good (2012)
Child's Hill Norfolk Secondary School Converter Academy 
(principally a boarding 
school)
Stand-alone school Non-denominational, co-
educational and separate 
admission arrangements 
for boarder and day  
students
Outstanding (2012)
Moorhead London Primary School Community Local Authority Non-denominational, co-
educational and non-
selective
Good (2012)
Bloomsbury London Secondary School Free School Stand-alone school Non-denominational, co-
educational and non-
selective
Pending
Ballard's Wood Norfolk Secondary School Foundation Trust (Co-operative Trust 
Model)
Non-denominational, co-
educational and non-
selective
Outstanding (2011)
Wingrave Norfolk Secondary School Community Local Authority Non-denominational, co-
educational and non-
selective
Requires 
Improvement 
(Satisfactory) (2013)
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life through principles and practices derived from the market. As Foucault observed, 
neoliberal governmentality should not be confused with laissez-faire (e.g. radically 
anti-state, complete deregulation and autonomy of the market from government 
interference) but instead ‘with permanent vigilance, activity and intervention’ (2008, 
132). On this account, it is possible to investigate the ways in which good 
governance operates as a new modality of state power and intervention – a 
dominant or organizing principle by which government steer the performance of 
governors through disciplinary tools of professionalization and inspection. 
 
The shadow of inspection 
 
As one anonymous chair of governors reported in a TES (2014) opinion column, the 
role of the school governor demands ‘playing advocate for the school’s defence in 
Ofsted’s harsh court’. Ofsted has always occupied a permanent ‘absent presence’ 
within English state schools to the extent that schools rely heavily on satisfying 
Ofsted criteria over what constitutes a good or even outstanding school. Government 
funding for schools follows students in a market-based education system and 
parents typically, though not always, exercise preference over which school to send 
their child to using information provided by Ofsted reports and league tables. The 
circular logic underpinning this system means schools are always under pressure to 
meet Ofsted evaluations of student performance and progress. Ofsted, therefore, is 
always already present during any GB meeting. 
 
And also I think it’s very important that the GB knows the school in terms of, 
you know, data, because that’s what Ofsted want to focus on, is data, so a 
weak GB will not understand the data, or will just accept the data, whereas a 
strong GB will, you know, be looking at it and asking questions about it, saying 
well why is this trend happening, or what are we doing about that particular 
blip that happened that year?  You know, they will look at it, and ask the 
question. (Katie, Parent Governor, Montague) 
 
As indicated in the above interview extract, the structure and form taken by some GB 
meetings includes a focus on Ofsted judgements and evaluations, and the 
preparedness and willingness of school governors to support and challenge senior 
leadership through careful reading and understanding of data pertaining to student 
performance and progression as well as finance. Ofsted is implicated and animated 
through the relations and practices of school governors, considered necessary to the 
formulation of effective verification and measurement of good verdicts, and even 
constitutive of meaningful and intelligible forms of contribution and challenge. Katie 
above, for example, conflates a weak GB with a disengagement from or lack of 
understanding of data, school governors who uncritically accept what is presented to 
them as fact, go unquestionably with the flow and grain of consensus, or fail to ‘read 
between the lines’, as another governor told me. In contrast a strong GB will discern 
patterns or relationships in the data, and crucially seek justification or rationalization 
(‘why’) for decisions taken and track any instances of dips, blips or anomalies in the 
data. As already detailed above, in addition to classroom teaching Ofsted also 
inspects and evaluates school governors on their knowledge and understanding of 
school data: 
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Yeah, but then I suppose when Ofsted come in they can call the governors 
more to account, and I know they do, and governance is something being 
looked at now very closely by Ofsted, governors have to be informed 
(Johanna, Head, Richford) 
 
School governors are under the watchful eye of Ofsted and therefore inhabit and 
perform their role through a field of relations and practices always already structured 
with Ofsted in mind. Moreover, it is common for senior leadership and in particular 
chairs of governors to conduct a skills audit of governors using peer evaluation and 
questionnaires, and even commission a governance review performed by an 
independent source. The purpose of a skills audit is to identify strengths and 
weaknesses within the GB in order that particular governors may be allocated to 
committees (education and standards, premises, human resources, legal, finance, 
pastoral and wellbeing, etc.) that best utilizes their skills, knowledge and 
background. Again, the shadow of Ofsted is explicit in the decision to conduct a skills 
audit or provide training: 
 
I mean the London Borough of [removed] organize training for governors 
continually throughout the year, and depending on what committee you are 
on, you sign yourself up for the current training, but as a whole GB, which 
something like Ofsted would affect us all, then we arrange an in-house whole 
GB, with the GB section, and they would get a trainer, an expert in that field to 
come in one evening and we would have a whole school training’ (Maria, Staff 
Governor, Moorhead) 
 
To assist school governors in their role, Ofsted have created the Ofsted Schools 
Data Dashboard (OSDD). The OSDD provides decontextualized results for each 
school based on student achievement levels for Key Stages 1-4. Data for ‘Similar 
schools’ and ‘All schools’ is represented graphically in quintiles sorted according to 
five categories where top quintile equals good and bottom quintile equals bad. 
OSDD is intended ‘for governors and schools to use in their drive for improvement’ 
(Ofsted website). In addition, Ofsted have introduced RAISEonline, an online digital 
archive of reports and analysis of attainment and progress levels for all schools, 
which schools in turn are encouraged to use as part of the self-evaluation process. 
The importance of these resources is well documented across all schools 
investigated in this study, reinforced by the regularity of their dispersion and repeated 
emphasis. The following is taken from a school improvement plan and documents 
the importance of inspection (and of OSDD and RAISEonline in particular) as 
discourses through which school governors are positioned and made knowable, 
measurable and inspectable as subjects. Knowledge equals performative efficacy: 
 
Inspectors will meet with as many governors during an inspection as is 
possible. They will want to know how well GBs use a range of information and 
evaluate the performance of the school, particularly in terms of pupils’ 
progress, the leadership of teaching and the management of staff. In February 
2013 Ofsted launched the data dashboard to help governors understand 
essential headline school performance data. Inspectors will want to know how 
governors are using this, and other information such as RAISEonline, to ask 
challenging questions which help the school to sustain high performance or to 
improve. The School Inspection Handbook and the subsidiary guidance 
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contain further information about how inspectors evaluate the effectiveness of 
governance. (School Improvement Plan 2014, Richford) 
 
Ofsted inspections may therefore be considered taxonomical, signifying, orientating 
practices by which good governance is normalized and school governor performance 
may be divisible, normalized, specified and differentiated through a ‘principle of 
compulsory visibility’ (Foucault 1979, 187). As the following interview extract 
demonstrates, Ofsted engenders forms and practices of seeing, knowing and 
understanding which some school governors value as well as emulate in their role 
and practice: 
 
I don’t want to be critical of the management of the school, because I think 
they do the job, but I just think it is important that they are monitored by the 
GB, and I’m sure they have all the answers, and they ought to have the 
information to provide those answers.  I’m sure if Ofsted came in they would 
immediately pick up on it, well certainly I think they would because I know 
quite a lot about it, because the headteacher who I dealt with in the primary 
school for many years is an Ofsted inspector and she knows what it’s like from 
the other side. (Oliver, Parent Governor, Child’s Hill) 
 
The imprint of professionalization 
 
In addition to inspection, the role and responsibility of school governors is changing 
under government demands for the professionalization of all GBs. As already 
indicated, the transfer of power and responsibility from central government to 
schools (a form of ‘double devolution’) translates into increased legal responsibility 
and (limited) liability for school governors wishing to self-govern, the implications of 
which are evident: 
 
I think as we move towards a more responsible, professional era of 
management responsibility then what you’ll be looking for will be more 
diverse, you’ll be looking not just for people who are rooted in the community, 
but I think you’ll be looking for people with skills to offer as well...I think to 
have a properly functioning set of institutions you need more people playing 
more roles than that, and I think when we get into setting up the 
subcommittees you are going to need some degree of expertise.  So, for 
example finance committee, you are going to need people who understand 
accounts and how to take measured financial decisions…I think it’s going to 
have to become more focused and more professional, because big sums of 
money are now being handled through each of the academies and collectively 
through the board. (Gordon, Company Secretary, Millard) 
 
In a similar way to how Ofsted functions to make subjects/processes visible, explicit, 
divisible, differential, and therefore amenable to measurement and commensuration, 
the discourse and practice of professionalization operates as a dividing practice, 
working to separate governors on the basis of skills, knowledge and value of 
contribution (e.g. worth in terms of enhancing accountability). 
 
Now you see that if you are going to have to manage all the finances, all this, 
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all that and so on, you need people who are professionals, not amateurs.  And 
the trouble is that most GBs, as I say, are amateurs.  I mean I’m an amateur. 
(David, Chair of Premises Committee, Canterbury) 
 
School governors may be separated (and even opposed as I will go onto show) 
through an amateur/professional distinction. Many school governors therefore judge 
the value of their contribution through a market logic and economization of relations 
driven by technical demands, legal responsibility and management overheads. In 
effect, the most desirable school governors are those who possess particular ‘hard 
skills’, notably skills and knowledge which enable the GB to make the school 
intelligible and responsive as a cost-cutting, profit-making business. Increasingly 
GBs are under pressure to make themselves answerable to measures of contract 
accountability (cost effectiveness) and corporate accountability (strategy and 
management) (see Ranson 2003 for a discussion of neoliberal accountability): 
 
I think they [school governors] are worthy people, who want to show an 
interest.  Emma [chair of governors] and I were talking about this yesterday 
actually, we don’t have much strength on the GB so there is a need to appoint 
a lot more people, but trying to find people who’ve got the right sort of 
experience from industry, commerce, that sort of thing, who want to give the 
time, is quite difficult.  But Emma has contacts in the business world so she is 
actively trying to recruit people. (Tim, Community Governor, Canterbury) 
 
Strength is equated with the presence of ‘skilled’ governors; in other words, a strong 
GB is one which is structured with particular people working at its centre, people with 
the right ‘skills’, preferably those who possess knowledge of business and finance. 
What the above extract captures is the changing expectations linked to the role of 
school governors. In 2012 the GB at Canterbury (a LEA maintained school) applied 
to the DfE to convert to academy status after consulting with staff, governors and 
parents. With the conversion expected to take place in early 2013, the GB and senior 
leadership at Canterbury explained how they were keen to utilize the new flexibilities 
and additional capital to build on their approach to delivering a unique curriculum 
model. In 2013 the DfE disallowed the conversion on the grounds that the 
commercial transfer agreement was not submitted on time, which the GB declared to 
be untrue. (The GB were convinced that the disallowed conversion was linked to the 
fact that 1) the school’s achievement results were below floor target (less than 40% 
of pupils achieving 5 A*-C at GCSE); and 2) the GB applied to convert as a stand-
alone school with the expressed wish not to be taken over by a large academy 
chain). Undeterred by this setback the GB announced plans to reapply to the DfE for 
academy conversion, subject to the GCSE results for 2013. In planning for a 
successful conversion, the school senior leadership, chair of governors and some 
long-standing governors were adamant on a change to the composition of the GB: 
 
I mean I don’t think the GB is strong enough to go into the position of being an 
academy, and certainly as an academy the greater responsibility that involves 
for governors. I don’t think the GB is up to it, so we have to get more 
governors with more experience from the outside world. (Tim, Community 
Governor, Canterbury) 
 
The conversion from maintained to academy status therefore means greater 
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regulation and exclusion over who gets to enter into governance roles. 
 
I mean in theory you can weed out weak governors, but in practice people 
will, to a large extent, get left alone, I know Emma has got some ideas about 
trying to make governors more accountable, and but I mean for example I’m 
pretty sure we’ve been talking about peer appraisal and that sort of thing, we 
haven’t actually done it, we haven’t actually done a skills audit or performance 
audit of governors. (Mark, LEA governor, Canterbury, London) 
 
The amateur/professional distinction (highlighted earlier by David above) is further 
translated by Mark through a weak/strong divide. Weak school governors are 
positioned through a deficit discourse which views civic or lay knowledge as either 
impractical or inexpedient to the task of ensuring the school is fit for purpose as an 
administratively self-governing institution. The implication here is that accountability 
is levelled as a practice and effect of technical efficiency, and runs the risk of 
undercutting a ‘stakeholder model’ of governance which aims to ensure (at least in 
theory) a culture of equal participation where people of specialist and civic 
knowledge may be valued equally and where ‘differences are voiced, deliberated 
and mediated’ (Ranson 2011, 411). Similar to Canterbury, Wingrave (also a 
maintained secondary school) applied to the DfE to convert to academy status in 
2013. The conversion was denied by the DfE and the GB at Wingrave elected to 
await the new GCSE results for 2013 before reapplying. Many school governors at 
Wingrave were clearly dismayed by the prospect of academy conversion, including 
legal responsibility for financial and educational performance: 
 
But the governor’s role is hugely different.  Well, no, it’s not really, in the great 
scheme of things, it’s not different is it?  But the responsibility feels so much 
heavier, and feels much more critical and legal and, which I’m sure it actually 
is now, if I’m honest, if something goes wrong and I’m meant to be in charge 
of it, I’d be culpable. (Maranda, Community Governor, Wingrave) 
 
A key role for school governors in the current education landscape, especially those 
with increased legal responsibility under the academy model, is to enhance 
accountability to the funders (the DfE) and to the regulatory body (Ofsted). Contract 
accountability and performative accountability emerge as the key frameworks 
through which governors’ skills, knowledge and potential contribution can be 
specified, differentiated and audited. Moreover, school governors are expected to 
possess ‘hard skills’ (technical expertise or specialist knowledge) to ensure a 
professional culture of governance driven by business values: 
 
‘Well, more in the direction of a business, and it’s inevitable, you know, it’s, 
you know, yes, I have my own views about the move towards academy 
schools and all the rest of it. However, that is without doubt the direction of 
travel, and there’s no doubt at all that schools in general, and governors as 
well, will have to have a greater and greater understanding of business-type 
ideas and issues around finance. (Robert, Assistant Headteacher, Wingrave) 
 
Ranson and Crouch (2009, 47) draw a similar conclusion in their study of school 
governance where they liken decentralizing education reforms with ‘the expansion of 
professional power at the expense of elected volunteers, and the corporatizing of 
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school ownership’. As Clarke (2008, 38) makes clear, ‘we can see how this may 
structure who gets to enter into governance roles, with preference being given to 
those who are the bearers of such ‘relevant knowledge and expertise’: legal and 
financial knowledge, business experience and so on…Others – such as the bearers 
of lay knowledge, or tacit knowledge of how a service works (from the vantage point 
of either workers or users) – may find themselves marginalised in the ‘business of 
governance’’. In fact, parallels can be drawn between the composition of GBs of 
housing associations within public-private partnerships and the (re)constitution of 
school GBs under academy and free school frameworks. In both cases, the kinds of 
board members who are valued most are typically those with skills in finance, legal 
and accounting, and who may enhance accountability to both the funders and the 
regulatory body (see Cowan, McDermont & Prendergast 2006). These demands 
have triggered a sea change in the culture of school governance marked by a shift 
away from a ‘bums on seats’ culture and a shift toward a risk-prepared, 
professionalized culture. Reflecting on the reconstitution of the GB of Canterbury in 
anticipation of converting to academy, the headteacher recalls how old actors were 
marginalized to make way for new actors and new expectations: 
 
‘Emma was already partially through restructuring the GB, and had already 
upset a few people, shall we say, in terms of encouraging their removal, and 
set up the members and, you know, worked out who was going to be on from 
the LEA, or who wasn’t going to be from the LEA, so we are already well 
down that journey, and we are now having to unpick all of that of course, 
because we are not an academy. So she’s having to go back and woo for a 
short period of time people she’s originally upset…like all GBs there are some 
very, very good, active appropriately challenging critical friends who bring a lot 
to the table, and there are other who see it as a, I wouldn’t say a social event 
because that would probably be cruel, but it does border on that. (Graham, 
Headteacher, Canterbury) 
 
The squeeze on all GBs to professionalize their members and prioritize skills-based 
appointment (see DfE 2014d) is threrefore already showing signs of affecting 
relations between governors, creating antagonism and tension where before it may 
not have existed. In a recent twitter exchange hosted by UKGovChat on the topic 
‘Accountability: who is answerable to whom?’ (see Storify 2013) we can discern the 
extent to which some school governors are scornful of others who lack the skills 
necessary to ensure the survival of schools under the current ‘high-stakes’ 
environment: ‘We are all accountable. If you can't stand the heat, stay out of the 
kitchen! And none of this 'just volunteers' rubbish!’. 
 
Performative efficacy and good governance 
 
In this paper I have considered the ways in which good governance (an appeal to 
professional standards, performance evaluation and technical expertise) operates as 
a new modality of state power and intervention; a set of policy technologies, political 
discourses and mobile strategies by which schools, and in particular school 
governors, are disciplined within new regimes of professionalization, inspection and 
accountability. These trends are inclusive and productive of what Ball (2003, 215) 
calls ‘performativity’: the managerial discourses and practices which require 
‘individual practitioners to organize themselves as a response to targets, indicators 
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and evaluations’. As Ball (2003, 224) goes onto later argue, ‘Truthfulness is not the 
point – the point is their effectiveness, both in the market or for inspection or 
appraisal’. Today school governors are confronted by a similar interpellation: a duty 
to mould, train and fashion the self in ways that can be measured, audited and 
inspected as evidence of effectiveness, of performative efficacy. In essence, school 
governors are being called upon to simulate the bureaucracy once performed by 
local government. As Fisher and Gilbert observe, ‘Bureaucracy has become 
decentralized. It’s not (just) something to which we are subject now; it’s something 
which we are required to actively produce ourselves’ (2013, 91). 
 
Since 2010 an unprecedented number of schools have converted to academy status 
and therefore opted out (or been forcibly driven out) of LEA control. According to 
recent statistics obtained by the DfE in June 2014 (DfE 2014c), 3,924 state 
secondary and primary schools have converted to academy status. Technically the 
same in legal terms (they constitute exempt charities and are supervised with the 
support of the Charity Commission by the DfE), academies and free schools operate 
independent of local government intervention, enabling them freedom to determine 
their own budget, admissions, length of school day, curriculum, and staff pay terms 
and conditions. A regulatory gap therefore exists (Adams & Mansell 2014). School 
autonomy means increased risk (risk of poor governance, poor training, poor 
evaluation, poor challenge, poor standards, etc.). The removal of local government 
steering has in turn given rise to demands for good governance, namely the 
inspection and professionalization of all GBs. So while the official role of school 
governors is to hold senior leadership to account for the financial and educational 
performance of the school, school governors are themselves held to account (by 
Ofsted and senior leadership who conduct a skills audit, for example) and in effect 
bound to ‘a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgements, 
comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition and change’ 
(2003, 216). This is what might be called a form of ‘meta-governing’ – the relation 
and process by which government and non-governmental agencies cultivate the 
conditions for ‘reflexive self-organization’ within public sector institutions and among 
actors (Jessop 2011, 246). 
 
Foucault (2008, 67) defines governmentalization as ‘the function of producing, 
breathing life into, and increasing freedom, of introducing additional freedom through 
additional control and intervention’. On this account it is possible identify the doubling 
effect produced by processes of decentralization and deregulation. The state grants 
powers to schools to become administratively self-governing but does so through 
subtle, indirect forms of control and regulation which demand good governance and 
the fashioning of school governors as professionals (not amateurs) who can justify 
and evidence in market terms school processes, outcomes and performance. 
Regulation is thus exercised at a distance – through discourses of 
professionalization and accountability, for example. It sets limits on the kinds of 
people who get to perform the business of governance, people with the right 
knowledge, skills and (claims to) expertise, people who can in effect enhance 
accountability. This is not to assume the success of governmental projects in practice 
across different sites and domains. Rather, it highlights how neoliberalization 
operates through processes of ‘roll-back’ (the removal of local government steering 
and command, for example) and ‘roll-out’ (the dissemination of market values and 
attitudes through multiple conduits, apparatuses and the creation of new actors) 
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(Peck & Tickell 2002). 
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